

MNC-I BUA Intel Daily Slides


Apr 07

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JAM Recent Reporting

- Late March, Sadr City JAM elements procure rockets, IED making materials
 - (b)(6) attempts to acquire 1,000m of wire for IEDs
 - Sadr City JAM commander confirmed delivery of possible 60mm rockets
- Sadrist associate concerned over CF 'shelling' of JAM near Sadr City
 - Believes CF attack clearing way for Sunni extremists to come into area



Assessment: Both rogue and mainstream JAM elements likely obtaining materials in preparation for additional retaliatory attacks to pressure CF for the release of Qays al-Khazali and other senior members. Sadrists likely to denounce alleged CF operations near Sadr City to expand public support for JAM during Fardh al-Qanoon.

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JAM Recent Reporting


- Sadrist position on Kirkuk referendum
 - Senior Sadrist CoR member Nassar al-Rubaie calls for signature campaign to delay Kirkuk referendum
- JAM special groups conflicting loyalties
 - All loyal to Sadr in varying degrees
 - Subordinate leaders have competing agendas
 - 5,000 members in special groups, allegedly little organization




Assessment: Sadrists will likely continue attempts to prevent Kurdish incorporation of Kirkuk. Secret cells may experience greater turmoil among leadership during Sadr's absence, but will maintain capability to attack CF.

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




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JAM Recent Reporting

- Sadrists reportedly deliberating response to CF operations
 - Three proposed COAs among Sadrists leaders to respond to 'occupiers'
 - 'All-out defense'
 - 'Cleaning and purging' trend
 - Disengagement to avoid targeting
- Retaliatory attacks continue in Wasit between Badr Organization and JAM
 - JAM planning renewed anti-Badr campaign if certain conditions not met



Assessment: MAS's absence and ambiguous guidance complicates decision making among mainstream Sadrists who remain divided over whether to resume attacks against CF. Negotiations between JAM and Badr unlikely to end tension in Wasit; rift will continue to grow between JAM and other Shi'a organizations as JAM members perceive themselves as lone Shi'a target of CF.

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JAM – Southern Provinces

- **JAM presence increasing in southern cities**
 - Response to Fardh al-Qanoon
 - JAM leaders perceive new power from increased local strength
 - IP heavily infiltrated by JAM (>50% locally)
 - IEDs to target CF patrols and movement along MSR/ASRs
- **JAM taking advantage of permissive climate (i.e. Diwaniyah, Kut)**
 - JAM leaders have direct relations with provincial/city IP officials
 - Militia control of several neighborhoods within provincial capitals
 - Unpaid security employees (FPS) provide JAM recruiting base
 - Militias openly carry weapons
 - JAM pointing at weak leadership/security to influence provincial elections

~~(S//REL)~~ As Diwaniyah, Kut become more permissive environments for JAM, other areas may follow. Locally-based leaders, new arrivals will continue to liberally interpret Muqtada al-Sadr's guidance and operate on the fringe of 'acceptable' JAM behavior.

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Stuff to talk about with (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. Direct relations and infiltration
2. JAM pointing out weak leadership and at the same
3. Sensitive reporting
4. ??

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Threat Update

- **AQI activity in Khalis**
 - Reporting indicates intent to attack between 3-9 April
 - Complex attack
 - Planners reportedly former regime IA
 - 7 April – Anniversary of collapse of former regime
 - Control necessary to ensure freedom of movement in Diyala
 - AQI views Khalis as last city in Diyala without large presence
 - Reporting indicates attack will be comprised of large number of fighters
 - Increased HP attacks in Khalis last 7 days
 - 3 April – VBIED detonated at IP checkpoint
 - 2 April – SVEST attack on market
 - 29 March - complex triple SVBIED attack on a market
 - Recent HP attacks in Khalis demonstrate increased AQI focus
 - All three incidents demonstrated significant effort in planning, execution of attacks

Assessment: Reporting of 7 April attack in Khalis unconfirmed by separate channels. Increased extremist OPTEMPPO in Khalis over last week, suggests attempt to intimidate population before upcoming attack intended to bring Khalis under general AQI control.

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Notes & Sources:

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CIDNE Trends Data

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JAM Recent Reporting

- Two senior Sadrists allegedly dismissed from parliament bloc
 - Salam al-Maliki, Qusay Abdul Wahab 'fired' for alleged contact with U.S. officials
 - Maliki denied U.S. contact, sacking
 - U.S. Embassy would neither confirm, deny contacts
- Senior Sadr bloc member pushing for (b)(6) release
 - (b)(6) detained since Jan 07, served as Sadr's primary spokesman in Baghdad
- Confusion among JAM leaders regarding Baghdad chain of command
 - Subordinate commander unable to determine brigade commander
 - Some leaders fled Baghdad preceding Fardh al-Qanoon
 - Recent capture of other leadership
 - Ongoing reorganization in response to turmoil

Assessment: Dismissal likely public demonstration to keep Sadrists in line; Sadrists will continue to assert anti-CF position in media statements. (b)(6) release could allay JAM fears entire movement is being targeted, bring coherence to Baghdad JAM. Confusion among JAM elements likely reflects command and control limitations due to recent leadership changes.


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AQI in Taji and Tarmiyah



- **AQI cells in Taji, Tarmiyah among most capable in Baghdad and belts**
 - 2 Feb: AH-64 Apache downing near Taji
 - 16 Feb: Attack on CF patrol boat
 - 19 Feb: Complex attack on Tarmiyah JSS
 - 20 Feb: Chlorine VBIED attack

- **AQI may have ordered some fighters to Baghdad Belts in response to Fardh al-Qanoon**
 - Fighters would enhance existing capabilities in Taji, Tarmiyah

- **Taji, Tarmiyah staging area for AQI**
 - Area used to launch attacks into Baghdad
 - Relatively permissive operating environment
 - Tigris River Valley Foreign Fighter Facilitation Route through Taji

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
MSR Tampa Through Taji


Assessment: *AQI in Taji and Tarmiyah are significant threat to Iraqi stability and CF due to capability, strategic location. Removal of Taji and Tarmiyah as safe haven through continued tribal engagement, CF operations may disrupt FF flow into Baghdad and reduce AQI effectiveness.*

3/23/2015 MNE/IC2/DSN (b)(6)

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10





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IO: Insurgent & Extremist Propaganda

Terrorists and Foreign Fighters (T&FF)

- ISI/AQI volume down from 430 to 270
 - Al-Baghdadi warned T&FF groups Gol plans to cause disagreement between them; labeled US, 1.4b Arab Governments, Ba'athist, moderate Islamic groups as enemies
 - Claimed 21 beheadings in Diyala between 9 and 26 Feb
 - Claimed downed helo on 13 Mar in Mosul; damaged Apache 1 Apr in Al-Karmah
- AS propaganda volume down from 40 to 19
 - Denied joining forces with IAI, Salah Al-Din BDE, and 1920's REV BDE
 - Abu-Abdallah warned Muslims against government 'deception tactic'
- IAI propaganda volume up from 32 to 37
- Miscellaneous propaganda volume up from 61 to 87
 - Naqshbandi Order denied participating in Coordination Office

Sunni Resistance

- Propaganda volume up from 8 to 16
 - 1920 REV BDE announced death of Harith Al-Dari, accused AQI of assassinating him
 - Coordination Office announced; claimed several Jihadist groups joined forces
 - Al-Rashidin Army denied cooperating with Iraqi Government

Assessment: AQI attempting to incite increased ethnic, sectarian violence in the north through selective propaganda focus. Groups publicly maintaining hard-line, denying mergers and reconciliation while talks continue. 1920 REV BDE anti-AQI theme is likely to increase tensions between AQI and Sunni Resistance groups.

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
<div style="text-align: center;">SECRET//REL TO USA, MCH//ZUL/0407// For display only to IRG</div> <h3 style="text-align: center;">Threat Update</h3> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Demonstration in Najaf<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Sadr orders 9 APR 07 demonstration in Najaf to call for removal of Coalition Forces– Emphasizes Iraqi unity and nationalist themes– Only previous OMS-wide demonstration on 9 APR 05, peaceful, 10-15K• Possible spontaneous, sympathetic demonstrations in Baghdad<ul style="list-style-type: none">– No specific reporting for demonstration– Baghdad OMS/JAM leaders may want to show solidarity• Threat to demonstrators in Najaf, Baghdad<ul style="list-style-type: none">– No specific reporting of AQI attack– ISF will be present in Najaf– Baghdad demonstrations likely small, temporary targets of opportunity <div style="background-color: yellow; padding: 5px;"><p>Assessment: Large Shi'a congregation presents high-profile AQI target. JAM will portray any successful AQI attack as CF's inability to provide security. Najaf chosen for easier control of environment. Demonstrations in Najaf, Baghdad likely to remain peaceful; attacks on IZ by JAM rogue elements possible.</p></div> <div style="text-align: center;">SECRET//REL TO USA, MCH//ZUL/0407// For display only to IRG</div> <div style="text-align: right;">14</div>
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JAM Recent Reporting

- 5 April IED attack in Basrah
 - JAM member Haidar Sabah reportedly informed of attack with 4 killed, 2 injured
 - Sabah linked to anti-CF activity in Basrah
- Gol official and MAS agree to continue coordination
 - MAS feels recent events hindering process
 - Says UI groups provoking JAM
- (b)(6) reportedly in Iran 1 April



Assessment: (b)(6) recent location in Iran suggests he may have met with MAS to discuss response to Qays al-Khazali's detention. Basrah IED attack possibly attempt by 'special group' leaders to demonstrate continued capabilities despite senior leaders' detainment. MAS likely to maintain only limited contact with Gol during absence.

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1920 Revolution Brigades: Implications of Split

- 1920 Rev Bde division into two factions
 - Islamic Jihad Corps: Mosul, Kirkuk, T
Abu Ghuraib, Baghdad
 - Likely to maintain militant anti-CF focus
 - Rejected calls to negotiate with Gol, CF
 - Hamans of Iraq (Islamic Conquest Cor|
Diyala, Anbar, Baghdad
 - Likely to introduce political focus, sustain militant position
 - Avoided public condemnation of engagement
 - Claims affinity with Hamas of Palestine; opposition to common Zionist, crusader foes, but no operational links

Assessment: *The 1920 Rev Bde schism is likely a result of internal tensions over organizational strategy; expect tactical military cooperation to continue. Hamans of Iraq will likely distance itself publicly from Islamic Jihad Corps as prelude to potential engagement opportunities.*

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16

IN TODAY'S OUTLOOK WE EXAMINE

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Threat Update

- **Demonstration in Najaf**
 - Sadr orders 9 APR 07 demonstration in Najaf to call for removal of Coalition Forces
 - Emphasizes Iraqi unity and nationalist themes
 - Only previous OMS-wide demonstration on 9 APR 05, peaceful, 10-15K
- **Possible spontaneous, sympathetic demonstrations in Baghdad**
 - No specific reporting for demonstration
 - Baghdad OMS/JAM leaders may want to show solidarity
- **Threat to demonstrators in Najaf, Baghdad**
 - No specific reporting of AQI attack
 - ISF will be present in Najaf
 - Baghdad demonstrations likely small, temporary targets of opportunity

Assessment: Large Shi'a congregation presents high-profile AQI target. JAM will portray any successful AQI attack as CF's inability to provide security. Najaf chosen for easier control of environment. Demonstrations in Najaf, Baghdad likely to remain peaceful; attacks on IZ by JAM rogue elements possible.

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- 1.4b, 1.4d, (b)(6)



Recent JAM Activity

Assessment:

1.4b, 1.4d

 suggests he may have met with MAS to discuss response to Qays al-Khazali's detention. Basrah IED attack possibly attempt by 'special group' leaders to demonstrate continued capabilities despite senior leaders' detainment. MAS likely to maintain only limited contact with Gol during absence.

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
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19

IN TODAY'S OUTLOOK WE EXAMINE

JAM Recent Reporting

- Planned demonstration in Najaf, Baghdad, possibly in Kut
 - New reporting indicates potential for violence
 - Sadrist circles speculating about Sadr's possible reappearance
- JAM allegedly planning attacks against CF, Sunnis early April
 - Possibly in Rusafa 9 April
 - Approx. 500 JAM members reportedly prepared for Sadr ordered attacks



Assessment: 9 April demonstrations likely to be peaceful, but isolated violence possible. JSS's, IZ most likely targets for separate attacks. Sadr's return 9 April unlikely, despite propaganda potential of emergence coinciding with demonstrations.

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JAM Recent Reporting

- 9 April demonstrations
 - Large numbers of likely JAM members traveling south from Baghdad
 - Destinations include Najaf and Karbala
 - Separate reporting of possible demonstrations at several locations in Baghdad
- Sadr issued message through OMS office in Najaf
 - Called for Iraqi unity in face of CF
 - No overt call for attacks on CF





Assessment: 9 April demonstrations likely to be more widespread than previous reporting indicated; expected to remain largely peaceful. Sadr's message allows for violent interpretation by more militant elements; attacks separate from protests possible. Goal of demonstrations and Sadr statement are reaffirmation of JAM strength and ability to affect national issues.

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JAM Recent Reporting

- Sadr Trend conducted nonviolent demonstration from Kufah to Najaf
 - Estimated 8-15,000 demonstrators attended march chanting pro-Sadr, anti-CF slogans



Assessment: *Relatively small number of demonstrators, lack of demonstrations elsewhere suggest support for Sadr may be weakening. Sadr's failure to appear in Najaf likely disappointed followers, demonstrates priority of his own safety above followers'.*

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24

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Regional Update

- (U) UNHCR Iraq Conference 17-18 April in Geneva
 - UNHCR estimates 1.9 million displaced internally, 730,000 since January 2006
 - Goal of conference is awareness, formation of partnerships
 - Follow-up to High Commissioner's March visit in Iraq with senior GoI officials
 - Conference closed to press, except opening events
 - Participants of note:
 - Heads of Iraqi, Lebanese, Syrian, Jordanian, Egyptian, Kuwaiti, Emirati Red Crescent Societies
 - Iraqi Minister of Displacement and Migration
 - Syrian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
 - US Under-Secretary, Assistant Secretary of State



~~(C//REL)~~ **Assessment:** Event will likely draw wide media coverage, while closed nature of forum will allow for some substantive progress on refugee issues.

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JAM Recent Reporting

- New reporting of JAM special groups' selection procedures, organization
 - BDE commanders screen, forward nominees from company/platoon commanders Najaf OMS office for approval
 - After approval, candidates receive specialized training
 - Multiple special groups assigned to each BDE
- Sadr allegedly feared Qays al-Khazali would attempt coup d'état within JAM



Assessment: Possibly as many as 30-45 special groups throughout Baghdad and southern Iraq. Sadr's previous fears of Qays al-Khazali usurping his authority may explain their troubled relationship into 2007.

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
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JAM Recent Reporting

- Sadr Trend criticized Gol statements on maintaining CF presence in Iraq
 - Trend reportedly considering withdrawal from government
- Despite intercession by senior Sadrists, MAS will not relent over dismissal of Salam al-Maliki and Qusay Abd al-Wahhab




Assessment: Sadrists will continue effort to pressure Gol for CF time-table withdrawal, though a complete Sadrist withdrawal from the Gol is currently unlikely. While Sadr privately refuses to rescind the dismissal of Maliki and Wahhab, the two Sadrists will likely remain a part of the movement.

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AQI / ISI Propaganda: On the defensive	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• IAI denounced AQI<ul style="list-style-type: none">– refuted Al-Baghdadi's last statement– accused AQI of crimes against Sunni civilians, religious leaders– asked Bin-Ladin to take responsibility for group– Deliberately used 'Al-Qa'ida in Iraq' instead of 'Islamic State of Iraq'• Kuwaiti Pro-Jihad Sunni cleric (b)(6) issued Fatwa recommending AQI 'retract the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq'• ISI / AQI forced to defend ISI position<ul style="list-style-type: none">– AQ writer (b)(6) suggested (b)(6) retract Fatwa on Islamic State of Iraq– ISI forums criticized IAI, countered (b)(6) halted posting of all IAI statements	
Assessment: IAI attack on ISI exposes the extent of the divide between AQI and Iraqi extremist groups, supporters. Criticism of ISI's Islamic Caliphate calls into doubt ISI's religious credentials and exposes ISI to attack from all sides.	
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Threat Update

- Reported Plan to Attack IZ Checkpoints
 - Single report indicates a terrorist group may intend to target IZ checkpoints with SVESTs.
 - Report indicates 3 x UI males and 2 x UI females to stage in West Rashid prior to attack
 - Source credibility undetermined
 - CIOC issued a situational awareness report 131633APR07
 - IZ continues to be a high priority target for all terrorist groups
 - 12 April - SVEST detonated in ICC building
 - 12 March - 2 SVESTs F/C in the IZ



Assessment: Attacks on IZ undermine perceptions of security, potentially destabilize the Gol while generating significant media attention. Insurgents may be emboldened to conduct additional SVEST attacks against the IZ in light of recent success. Extremists likely consider checkpoints easier targets, with some attacks used to breach the CP.


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Al-Duri – Fighting for Control of NBP

- Al-Duri will continue attempt to undermine Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad's (MYA) Iraqi support base
 - Reaching out to tribes
- Al-Duri will likely promote a militant, Iraq-centric operational agenda to distinguish from Syrian-based MYA
 - Possible name change to organization
 - Plans to elect new leadership
- MYA is unlikely to feel threatened by al-Duri's efforts and will continue dual-tracked strategy
 - Anti-CF publicly
 - Supporters considering dialogue with C



Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri



Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad (MYA)

Assessment: Despite efforts to undermine MYA, al-Duri is unlikely to regain his previous level of control. Tension between MYA and al-Duri will polarize NBP supporters into two camps. MYA unlikely to change strategy. He will reassert his operational credentials to discredit al-Duri, appeal to militants.

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Threat Projection

- **Threats to Tigris River Bridges**
 - Multiple reports indicate unspecified terrorist group may plan to use IEDs or VBIEDs to blow up bridges
 - Reporting cites Bab al Mu'Azam, Adhamiyah, and al Sha'ab Bridge as potential targets
 - No specific timing
 - CIOC issued a situational awareness report 1.4c
- **Two recent HP attacks on infrastructure targets in Baghdad**
 - 12 Apr: VBIED on Sarafiyah Bridge
 - 14 Apr: VBIED on overpass leading to Jadriya Bridge
 - AQI claimed or assessed responsible for both attacks

1.4c

Assessment: Infrastructure attacks in Baghdad endeavor to undermine Fardh al-Qanoon successes, destabilize Gol, ensure continued AQI relevance. Group will adapt, shift target sets in reaction to changing security environment.

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32

- Sadr Trend says split from Gol inevitable
 - According to head of Sadrist Political Committee al-Mutayyiri, 'withdrawal may take place in matter of days'
- Committee of 10 senior Sadrists formed to operate in Sadr's absence
 - Probably working directly for MAS
 - Committee allegedly includes: (b)(6)




Assessment: Recent threats to withdraw from the Gol are likely in response to operations targeting JAM in southern Iraq and lack of Gol support for a CF withdrawal timeline. A permanent withdrawal is unlikely as it would isolate the Sadrist movement and ruin Sadr's position as a legitimate Shi'a leader. Reported ten-person committee will likely maintain effective C2 during Sadr's absence.

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JAM Recent Reporting

- **16 April, Sadr Trend withdrawal from ministries to be declared at press conf.**
 - Discontent with GoI refusal to set CF withdrawal timeline
 - Five Ministries: Tourism, Transportation, Health, Agriculture, State for CoR Affairs
- **If Sadrists escalate to full pullout from CoR, quorum more difficult**
 - Sadr Trend controls 28 CoR seats
 - Hydrocarbon, de-Ba'athification reform vulnerable to delays





Assessment: Sadr Trend withdrawal from ministries unlikely to significantly impact government functions; full withdrawal from CoR would likely impede passage of key legislation. Given lack of success of previous withdrawal, future attempt would serve only to further increase tensions within OMS.

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Threat Update

- Large, complex attack on Karmah IP Station, OP Omar
 - AQI plan to target IP and CF between 14-27 Apr
 - AQI attackers allegedly will arrive in 30 vehicles
 - Last attack on Karmah IP was complex attack 12 Apr
 - SVBIED, SAF, IDF and RPG
 - 8 x CF WIA
 - 8 x AIF killed
 - CIOC issued situational awareness report 1.4c



Karmah IP Station

1.4c

Assessment: Alleged AQI leader of attack controls several insurgent cells operating in the Karmah and Fallujah areas. Use of 30 vehicles likely inflated number. Attack will likely include IDF, RPG, and SAF, (S)VBIED possible.

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Threat Update

- **AQI Threat to Muthana Bridge in Baghdad**
 - AQI elements targeting bridge supports
 - To be carried out by AQI elements from Gumayrah, Mushahadah
 - Planned to take place at night, from surrounding trees
 - Group currently located at Mjoram Arshad al Yasin and Mujram Saba' Irbahuim al Hasan Farms near Kadhamiyah
 - Unspecified timing of attack
 - Threats to bridges increased in light of recent attacks
 - 12 April – Successful VBIED attack on Sarafiyah Bridge
 - 14 April – Unsuccessful VBIED attack on Jadriya Bridge
 - Recent reporting, recovered documents indicate increased AQI focus on bridges

1.4c

Assessment: Near term attempt to attack Muthana Bridge with VBIEDs possible, unlikely AQI has institutional knowledge required to properly construct and emplace charges sufficient to cause catastrophic loss of bridge structure.

38

SCRIPT:

Notes & Sources:

1.4c

CIDNE Trends Data

Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USCOL36065620070224>

NY Times online article

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Threat Update

- SVBIED attack on Fallujah Government-Military Operations Center (GMOC)
 - AQI plan to target IP and IA, allegedly in response to IP Chief's refusal to recognize ISI
 - Last attack on Fallujah IP was complex attack 28MAR07
 - 2 x SVBIEDs (Chlorine), SAF, IDF
 - 17 x CF WIA
 - 57 x ISF WIA
 - 1 x CIV INJ
 - 5 x AIF killed
 - CIOC issued situational awareness report 171549APR07



1.4c

Assessment: ISF resistance to AQI overtures likely to elicit attacks against symbols of GoI authority in Anbar. Attack planning is consistent with AQI TTPs, will likely include IDF, SAF, SVBIED(s).

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39

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Threat Update

- Assassination plans in Qadisiyah Governorate
 - UI JAM members plan to assassinate four members of governing council
 - Chairman of Governorate Council
 - Fadilah, SCIRI, Hizb al-Wafaq al-Watani Council Members
 - Motivation for attack is council members' support for CF in Diwaniyah
 - Attack date unspecified, planned for after CF withdrawal following Operation BLACK EAGLE
 - CIOC issued a situational awareness report 171602APR07



Assessment: Ongoing intra-Shi'a conflict in southern Iraq likely additional motivation for planned attack. Attack possibly kidnapping, execution or direct attacks. The attack is consistent with known JAM TTPs and attack motivations.

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JAM Recent Reporting

- Internal views on Sadrist Gol pullout
 - Senior Sadrist Hajji Shibl believes withdrawal a mistake
- Senior Sadrist (b)(6) named part of committee tasked with selecting members of Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)
 - (b)(6) said candidates should have no bias toward a particular political party



Assessment: Shibl's statement reflects growing disagreement among senior Sadrists over the movement's participation in the Gol. Despite (b)(6) comments, he will likely work to ensure IHEC members are sympathetic towards Sadrists' agendas.

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41

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JAM's Future With Ahmad al-Sheibani

- Senior Sadrist Ahmad al-Sheibani likely to resume position as one of the top three influential Sadrists
 - Released 21 Mar 2007 after over 2 years in Coalition custody
 - Detained 21 Sep 2004 for involvement in the 2004 Sadrist uprising in Najaf
 - Prior to detention, served as Sadr's chief adviser, JAM leader
- Previously associated with the Sadrist "militant wing"
 - Associates included Qais al-Khaz'ali and Jabbar al-Khafaji
- Al-Sheibani already returned to senior position
 - Currently serves on 10-person committee in Najaf designated to act in Sadr's absence



Sheibani

Assessment: Considering al-Sheibani's militant ideology and his prominent role in the 2004 Najaf uprisings, his senior position in the movement and access to Sadr could help lead the organization into a more confrontational position with CF in the coming months.

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42

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Regional Update

- (U) Iraqi debt forgiveness
 - Saudi Arabia confirmed agreement to forgive “80 percent” of estimated \$15-18 billion
 - Total debt: \$340-380 billion
 - ~ \$140 billion in loans
 - ~ \$199 billion in war compensation
- (U) UNHCR Iraq Conference concluded
 - Permanent UNHCR representative to be based in Baghdad
 - All parties committed to not turning away refugees
 - Specific assistance to be determined in coming months
 - Iraq pledged \$25 million to support IDPs, refugees in neighboring countries



(C//REL) Assessment: While a relatively small portion of outstanding debt, the Saudi loan forgiveness is likely an attempt to demonstrate leadership in the region, counter perceived Iranian influence with Gol; potential for further progress on debt forgiveness at upcoming conference in Egypt.

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43

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JAM Recent Reporting


- JAM attempting to expand political legitimacy and membership
 - Utilizing public work projects; providing villages with water, electricity, etc
 - Trying to discredit GoI to gain public support
 - Ongoing disagreement within JAM whether to engage politically or respond violently
- (b)(6) said Sadrist withdrawal would not benefit Sadr Trend




Assessment: JAM elements likely to continue public work projects in low income villages, where public more reliant on outside assistance, receptive to JAM. (b)(6) comments suggest senior Sadrist parliamentarians in political wing sharply disagree with Najaf headquarters over optimal COA for the movement.

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Mujahidin Army: Pragmatic Islamists

- Mujahidin Army (MA) balances nationalist and Islamist goals
 - Ideologically *Islamic* but less extreme than AS and AQI
 - Does not subscribe to AQI's broader goals of transnational jihad
 - Some members seek MNF-I tactical alliance, others ideologically opposed
 - Tolerant of Sunni engagement in political process
- Leadership perceptions of threats to Sunni interests shifted in 2006
 - Challenging AQI in association with Islamic Army of Iraq and AS
 - Recognizes MNF-I will eventually leave and is positioning for post-withdrawal
- Public statement supporting possible negotiations with MNF-I
 - 26 March interview on Al-Jazirah with MA Spokesmen

Assessment: *A cease-fire with CF is a realistic goal but enforcing member compliance will be difficult. MA will likely continue to pursue an agreement with CF to the extent it's leadership assesses it could provide viable alternatives to continued fighting in the insurgency.*


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JAM Recent Reporting

- Senior Sadrist al-Mutayyiri says JAM will not retaliate for recent Baghdad bombings
 - Asserts Shi'a residents want JAM to return to the streets in force
 - “We can not move without approval from the government”
- Threat(s) of PM assassination
 - JAM “intelligence” reportedly alerted PM’s office of possible assassination attempt; group plotting assassination not identified
 - Separate reporting suggests JAM is planning an assassination attempt on PM



Recent JAM Activity

Assessment: Mutayyiri attempting to demonstrate Sadrist cooperation with the GoI during Baghdad security operations, while implying need for JAM, rather than ISF, to provide security. Other Sadrists will likely continue to exploit bombings, allege popular demands for JAM's return to the streets. JAM message possibly attempt to appear supportive, while also applying pressure to GoI.

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46

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Insurgent Propaganda: Shifting Trends, Searching for Unity

- Insurgent IO trends
 - Predictable surge in propaganda volume following key events such as announcement of FAQ, Baghdad Int'l Conf, Iraqi Freedom Day
 - Propaganda focus shifted from offensive to defensive/reactionary
- Widely covered statement from Umar al-Baghdadi invited AS, IAI, 1920 Rev BDE to join ISI
- Ansar al-Sunnah attempt to appear united undermined by public defections
 - Denied reconciliation and merger talks

Assessment: Groups will continue to issue statements showing Sunni resistance unity while at the same time vying for control of the Sunni insurgency. Expect surge in propaganda one week prior to upcoming Neighbors' Conference, with all major groups issuing denouncements.

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47

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Threat Assessment: Anniversary of Saddam Hussein's Birthday

- Anniversary of Saddam Hussein's birthday 28 April

- Celebrated as a public holiday under former regime
- Last celebrated in 2002

Threat Area	Assessed Threat
Threat to Coalition Forces (CF)	Low
Threat to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)	Low
Threat to Civilians	Low
Overall Threat	Low

- Threat of increased attacks
 - No current threat reporting to suggest increased attacks against CF, ISF, or civilians

Assessment: The overall threat for this event is LOW. There is no intelligence to suggest that Saddam's birthday will result in increased attacks against CF, ISF, or civilians. Former regime elements are unlikely to use the event to increase attacks against GOI, CF targets.


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JAM Recent Reporting

- Senior Baghdad JAM commander (b)(6) plans to purge JAM of disloyal members
 - Meeting held on 18 Apr to discuss plan
 - (b)(6) a close associate of National JAM commander Abbas al-Kufi
 - Definition of “loyalty” unclear
- Salam al-Maliki and Qusay Abd al-Wahab reinstated to Sadrist bloc
 - OMS Political Committee said “innocence from the charges against them has been established”



Recent JAM Activity

Assessment: Indications of further purges within JAM demonstrate continued attempts by al-Kufi to reassert control over Baghdad JAM, remove elements whose activities draw undesired attention to JAM, OMS, Sadr. Maliki and Wahab's reinstatement was expected. The OMS Political Committee likely feared their continued separation from Sadrists could cause a splinter bloc.

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49

Sunni Religious Leaders & Their Organizations

- Samarra'i's recently established Council of Iraqi Scholars will weaken Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS), fill void as moderate voice of Sunni populace
- Waqf conduit for government support to Sunni community irrespective of religious rhetoric
- Harith al-Dhari's hardline leadership of AMS shows no signs of altering anti-CF leanings



Ahmad 'Abd al-Ghafur al-Samarra'i




Harith Sulayman al-Dhari al-Zawbai


Assessment: Establishment of Council of Iraqi Scholars is a positive development for Iraqi Sunnis. Support of the Council and Samarra'i, especially by the GOI, would further erode al-Dhari's relevance and influence in Iraq. Samarra'i's attempts to establish a moderate Sunni alternative to the AMS likely to succeed; however, it is unlikely it will completely replace al-Dhari's influence in the Sunni community.

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Constant CF operational activity in Diyala has limited sectarian tensions vice anti-CF targeting.






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Threat Update

- Suicide attack on school in Mosul
 - AQI reportedly plan to target CF, IP during visit to unidentified school in Mosul 24 or 25 April
 - Separate reporting suggests possible AQI attacks against IP in Mosul scheduled for 24 April
 - CIOC issued situational awareness report 1.4c



Assessment: CF, ISF cooperation in support of local services likely to elicit attacks against symbols of GoI authority in Mosul. AQI possesses capability, intent; attack planning is consistent with AQI TTPs and recent focus on Mosul IP, will likely include SVEST(S) or SVBIED(S).

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53

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JAM Recent Reporting

- Sadr Trend planning to retain influence within ministries despite publicly announced withdrawal
- Senior Sadrist Baha al-Araji gives different reasons for withdrawal
 - Asserts Sadr Trend wants end to sectarian quota system
 - Believes technocrats should be given important ministerial positions
 - Claims Sadrists plans to remain part of UIA



Assessment: Despite public attempts to support a non-sectarian agenda, Sadrists will likely use less visible subordinate positions within ministries to continue pursuing anti-Sunni and anti-CF agendas. Significant pressure from Shi'a religious clerics will likely compel Sadrists to remain in UIA despite significant disagreements with the Shi'a coalition.

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
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Vulnerability of Southern Oil Infrastructure

- A one-time spectacular attack against a critical node by an organized extremist group remains a possibility
 - Strength of Shi'a groups severely impacts Sunni insurgent freedom of maneuver
 - Security for key nodes likely incapable of defending against organized attack
- The influence of Shi'a militias over oil operations serves to mitigate threats
 - Black market involvement provides incentive for uninterrupted oil flow
- Tribal or militia elements could threaten infrastructure to extort protection money or to increase relative power
 - Threats unlikely to result in significant damage due to criminal, militia interests in uninterrupted oil flow

Key Southern Oil Nodes



The map shows the following locations: Al Ramayyah (PS-1) Pump Station, WSA-1 (Tosha) Pump Station, WSA-2 Pump Station, Az Zubayr Pump Station, Al Basrah Refinery, Hossain Junction, Kharr az Zubayr oil product import facility, Al Faw Headfield Metering Station, Pipeline Block Valves, Kharr az Zubayr (Point Hector) LPS oil product import facility, and KRGOT. A red arrow points to the 'C//REL' label.

(S//REL) Assessment: *The major Shi'a groups in southern Iraq will continue to ensure a modicum of infrastructure security as long as they continue to have access to oil for black-market profit. However, the current security apparatus is incapable of defending against a well-organized attack by an extremist group.*

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Stuff to talk about with (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. Direct relations and infiltration
2. JAM pointing out weak leadership and at the same
3. Sensitive reporting
4. ??

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JAM Recent Reporting


- OMS officials in Sadr City and Najaf reportedly propose to nominate different candidates for Minister of Transportation
 - Sadr City OMS intends to nominate (b)(6) and (b)(6)
 - Najaf OMS official Riyadh al-Nuri supports Ahmad al-Sharifi
- As of mid April, senior Sadr aide Ahmad al-Shaybani reportedly 1.4b, 1.4d




Assessment: Supporting the nomination of either (b)(6) would contradict previous Sadrist statements calling for independent technocrats to fill ministry positions. Shaybani likely 1.4b, 1.4d to meet with Sadr and discuss leadership changes for mainstream JAM, special groups.

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56



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Insurgent Opposition to AQI

- Ansar Al-Sunna (AS), Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI), Mujahidin Army (MA) debating relationship with AQI publicly, privately
- Opposition to AQI from leadership of AS, IAI, MA will likely cause defection of more extreme elements to AQI
- Localized elements of AS, IAI, MA will continue to cooperate tactically with AQI
- AQI will continue to pursue dual-track approach to counter AS, IAI, MA
 - Targeting leaders who oppose AQI
 - Co-opting other members into AQI


Assessment: Opposition to AQI will continue to vary by location and group. Increased insurgent leadership opposition to AQI is unlikely to prevent elements of AS, IAI, MA from conducting attacks against CF in the near-term.

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57



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Threat Update

- **Continued AQI Targeting of Zoba'i Tribal Opposition**
 - AQI reportedly planning to attack Zoba'i tribal leaders including 'abd al-Rahman Thahir al Dhari
 - Planned attack in response to alleged meeting between shaykhs and CF in early April
 - (b)(6) Zoba'i leader Harith Thahir al-Dhari, assassinated by AQI 27 Mar 07 in Abu Ghraib
 - Goals of attack are elimination of key leaders in local opposition to AQI, intimidation of al-Zoba'i and other potential opposition tribes

Assessment: Al-Zoba'i shaykhs fill key leadership posts in growing opposition to AQI. Expected AQI intimidation campaign will attempt to prevent Abu Ghraib becoming another Ramadi.


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JAM Recent Reporting

- Senior Baghdad JAM commander al-Hilfi outlined supposed jurisdictional differences between JAM and “Special Groups” in mid-Apr
– Alleged JAM has authority in major cities
– Asserted Special Groups have control outside cities
– Believes JAM members can arrest Special Group members operating within cities
– Did not define exact nature of both groups’ powers
- Najaf OMS sent a team to Hurriyah in late Apr
– Sent to dismantle a renegade JAM group



Assessment: Hilfi is likely attempting to assert JAM control over Special Groups through his jurisdictional definitions; however, such definitions contradict other reporting. Mainstream and Special Group members are unlikely to entirely conform to these guidelines, causing additional infighting, similar to that currently reported in Hurriyah.

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59

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Insurgent Propaganda

- AQI further attempts to legitimize ISI
 - Announced formation of ISI cabinet and ministers
 - Warned Sunnis not to turn against ISI
- AS attempts to bolster public face while subtly attacking AQI
 - Alluded to ignorance in AQI methods, “emotional behavior”
- Insurgent attack claim trends
 - AQI requires continued growth in volume, claims of effective attacks to maintain support base and appearance of momentum
 - AQI surges attack claims in response to threats to its military power (FAQ), while other Sunni groups respond to international media events (International Conference)

Assessment: *Sunni groups continue attempt to maintain facade of unity, while developing subtle attacks on each other. Expect AQI to focus on political statements as counter to attacks on ISI legitimacy, while sustaining attack claims, as failure to demonstrate results would hinder AQI fundraising.*

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JAM Recent Reporting

- JAM Special Group leaders Abu Zaki, Abu Dharr reportedly frustrated with some JAM members
 - Believe Special Groups should not be tied to presumably mainstream JAM elements
- Former senior JAM leaders rumored to be resuming duties in Baghdad
 - Mustafa al-Bahadli, 'Ali al-Musawi, 'Ala al-Khawajah reportedly removed in Nov as part of JAM effort to expel rogue elements
- JAM temporarily closes Nasiriyah office fearing CF retaliatory attacks



Assessment: Frustrations of Abu Zaki, Abu Dharr likely an indication of Special Groups' desire to maintain independence from mainstream JAM elements in order to ensure effective operations, prevent compromise. Returning JAM leaders likely to resume anti-CF and possibly sectarian activities. JAM Nasiriyah office's closing unlikely to disrupt JAM activities in the area.

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61

Competing Communication Strategies of 1920 Rev Bde & Hamas-Iraq's

- Following late March split, 1920 Rev Bde and Hamas-Iraq employing competing communications strategies targeting same audience
- Hamas-Iraq working to build credibility as insurgent organization
 - Seeking to allay internal fears of being 'pro-CF' through anti-CF operations
 - 04 Apr, Hamas-Iraq claimed responsibility for alleged destruction of CF military vehicle
- 1920 Rev Bde will focus on reaffirming operational, nationalistic and religious credentials
 - 1920 Rev Bde reply to Umar al-Baghdadi statement used to detail 1920 Rev Bde aspirations for Iraq while articulating support for insurgent unity, criticism of ISI TTP's

Assessment: Split affords 1920 Rev Bde and Hamas-Iraq the opportunity for more coherent, targeted, and agile communication strategies. Both organizations will compete for support, but 1920 Rev Bde's established message, reputation is positioned to have greater success within the insurgency due to Hamas-Iraq's need to establish insurgent credentials before acceptance of its political agenda.

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62

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JAM Recent Reporting

- Mid-Apr, Ahmad al-Shaybani reportedly replaced 'Abbas al-Kufi as national JAM commander
 - According to claims by high-level OMS official (b)(6)
- 27 Apr, al-Kufi planned to travel to likely 1.4b to possibly be dismissed by MAS
 - Sadr indicated his intention to dismiss al-Kufi one week prior
 - Al-Shaybani also recently 1.4b, 1.4d



Assessment: Sadr likely decided to place al-Shaybani into a senior position soon after his release 21 March from CF detainment. Al-Shaybani is much more respected by Sadr and other JAM leaders than al-Kufi. Al-Shaybani's role in the 2004 uprisings, militant background could better prepare JAM for future confrontations with CF; leadership will likely help organize JAM, consolidate more solidly under Sadr's control.

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63

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Threat Update

- Large scale attack against CF in village near Muqdadiyah
 - Late Apr, AQI planned to attack military base in Shakarat
 - Likely referring to patrol base K-Wall located in Shakarat
 - 24 APR – Dump truck stolen IVO Muqdadiyah, has not been recovered
 - Possibly intended for employment as VBIED
 - AQI advised local residents to leave their homes
 - Prior to OP Saber Blvd (14-22MAR) Shakarat area assessed to be AQI forward logistics area for weapons caching, VBIED, IED manufacture
 - CIOC issued a situational awareness report 291155DAPR07



Assessment: No other reporting in the past thirty days of large scale attack in the Shakarat village or Muqdadiyah; however, other Diyala River Valley complex attack plots detailed in recent threat stream. Attack will likely target PB K-Wall in Shakarat, as it is perceived as less hardened than large FOB's located nearby. Methodology will likely be similar to attack in as-Sadah including SVBIEDs, IDF, RPGs.

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64

